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Summary 
 
Bank employees in the Netherlands want to focus on clients and the interests of 
their clients. But they feel constrained to do so by the dominant banking culture. 
They have low trust in their employers, they feel not motivated by the targets they 
are required to meet, and they experience very limited autonomy. This affects their 
service orientation towards clients. More autonomy, less emphasis on targets, and 
more openness in the relationship with managers is likely to further the interests of 
bank clients. 
 
 
The study 
These are the key results of a representative sample of 617 respondents who work 
at Dutch banks and are member of a labour union (FNV, CNV and DeUnie). The large 
majority is employed at the three top banks (ABN AMRO, ING and Rabobank). The 
background characteristics of the respondents are quite similar to those of the 
average bank employee in the Netherlands. A simultaneous sample of 400 
employees in the financial sector of a client panel with 20,000 participants by TV 
show EenVandaag shows similar results for the key questions (unpublished). The 
average age is a bit higher for the respondents of the SFL survey as compared to the 
average age of Dutch bankers. 
 
Bankers are best informed to judge the extent to which client interests are served by 
banks. They know the clients and the bank's products and services. Therefore, they 
are in the best position to evaluate the extent to which products and policies of 
banks effectively serve clients interests. In 2014 we approached them with a survey 
on banking culture. 
 
Banking culture 
The 2008 financial crisis has revealed the importance of banking culture for the 
performance of the sector and its contribution to the real economy and society. 
Behaviour and the management of behaviour strongly determine whether client 
interests are served. The literature distinguishes between three cultures, each 
informed by a different ethical approach (Den Hartog and Verburg, 2004; van 
Staveren, 2007): 
 Utilitarian ethics, which is the foundation of neoclassical economics, in which 
behaviour is judged on the basis of results; in the financial sector this implies a 
focus on targets and earnings as indicators of individual and organizational 
success. 
 Moral duties, based on the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant, in which the 
principles of rights and duties are the basis for moral judgment; in the financial 
sector this implies an emphasis on rules, compliance and supervision.  
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 Ethics of care, based on the social virtues in Aristotle's virtue ethics, in which 
relationships and the recognition of human vulnerability determine contextual 
moral responses; in the financial sector this implies taking responsibility for the 
quality and maintenance of financial relationships. 
 
The literature on banking culture shows that the complexity of financial services 
benefits from the intrinsic motivation of professionals (Baard, Deci and Ryan, 2004; 
Mazzucato, 2013; Berrone, Surraco and Tribo, 2007; Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012; Amabile and Kramer, 2012). These studies indicate that organizational cultures 
with less emphasis on competition, targets, and dominant leadership generally show 
more effective organizations and better performance. 
 
The objective of client focus in banking, as formulated by the Dutch Banking 
Association (NVB) after the crisis, fits well with the ethics of care. However, before 
2008, it was utilitarian ethics that was dominant in Dutch banks. Since 2008, the 
Dutch supervisory bodies (the central bank, DNB, and the financial market authority, 
AFM) have introduced very detailed regulation, which has resulted in a dominant 
culture of moral duties. But what about an ethics of care, to match the sector-wide 
claim of a return to client focus? The SFL survey has tried to find answers to this 
question, by inquiring into the motivation, behaviour, and service delivery by Dutch 
bankers. 
 
Results 
The large majority of bank employees (92%) wants to put client interests first. But in 
reality this is not always the case. Many employees experience that work pressure 
puts a constraint on serving clients interests: 40% experience this constraint often 
and 42% experience this sometimes. Cost-cutting measures and new regulation are 
seen as the main reasons behind this constraint. 86% of the bankers agree with the 
new regulation. A quarter of the employees experience little or very little autonomy 
and room for taking initiative. Client orientation has not really changed since the 
crisis: a third notes a worsening, while another third part of the employees signals an 
improvement and the remaining third part of bankers sees no difference in service 
delivery at all. A majority experiences a tension between the products that their 
bank offers and the interests of clients. 5% of the employees who have direct 
contact with clients admitted to have sold products that they do not judge to be in 
the interest of clients. 
 
Employees are critical about the top of their bank. 76% notes that the top puts client 
interests first in words but only 28% signals that they walk the talk. Variable pay is 
almost completely banned by ING and Rabobank, but performance targets remain 
important for all three large banks. 74% is subject to Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs). When asked about the effectiveness of KPIs, the respondents are quite 
sceptical. 63% states that sales targets are not in the interest of clients and only 14% 
feels motivated by KPIs. Now that the carrot of variable pay had become much less 
influential, KPIs now drive the stick of lay-off, according to answers to the open 
questions. 
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Conclusion 
The large majority of bank employees in the Netherlands focuses on client interests. 
But the intrinsic motivation of the average banker is undermined by a large gap in 
the walk and talk of the leadership, a strong focus on extrinsic motivation through 
KPIs, limited autonomy, low trust, and limited openness by managers to feedback. 
 
Banks depend predominantly on utilitarian ethics in guiding motivation and 
performance of their employees, while they rely on compliance in case of ethical 
dilemmas. But the average bank employee takes the ethics of care as the dominant 
approach to the role of banks and likes to contribute to this in a caring work 
atmosphere. It is not easy to put the ethics of care into day-to-day practices because 
of the pressure bankers experience from a dominant utilitarian ethics, the distrust of 
colleagues outside their own team, and the cost-cutting measures and increased 
regulation. 
 
In summary, the average bank employee in the Netherlands is committed to serving 
client interest. But the dominant banking culture is still firmly founded upon a 
system of extrinsic motivation. The challenge of cultural change in Dutch banks is 
how to solve this mismatch. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The reform of the Dutch banking sector after the crisis takes banking culture into 
account. Dutch banks and supervisory bodies even take the lead in this area  
internationally. The Dutch government has enforced a much lower bonus cap than 
the EU (20% instead of 100% of the fixed salary), there is a bankers oath, and a new  
law to protect consumer interest. De Nederlandsche Bank has expanded supervision 
to behavioural dimensions of the leadership of banks, the Autoriteit Financiele 
Markten implements a dashboard to monitor client orientation of banks, and the 
Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken has agreed upon a social contract with a set of 
behavioural rules and legal measures. 
 
But what is the impact of the policies around cultural change? The Sustainable 
Finance Lab (SFL) has tested this with a survey among bankers. In the period 2012-
2014, SFL-members Irene van Staveren and Rens van Tilburg had various rounds of 
consultation with the top three banks. Although this has resulted in a better insight 
into the ongoing cultural changes, the leadership of two of the three banks did not 
support a survey to be held through the banks' internal channels. There was a clear 
fear for negative media coverage of the survey results, reinforcing the low levels of 
trust of the Dutch population in banks. 
 
The labour unions and tv show EenVandaag appeared to have a similar plan for a 
survey, so we decided to join forces and to implement a joint survey through the 
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labour unions. EenVandaag has asked some of the questions to financial 
professionals in their own client panel with quite similar results as our survey. They 
also asked similar questions to the whole client panel from the perspective of clients, 
with a sample size of over 20,000, with again quite similar results, even though only 
of 15% is member of a labour union1. 
 
This report presents the results of the joint survey of the Sustainable Finance Lab, 
the labour unions and EenVandaag. The results were summarized in a Dutch 
economics journal (van Staveren en van Tilburg, 2014), presented in a tv show, and 
discussed with a board member of ABN AMRO in a public meeting at the bank's 
headquarters in Amsterdam. 
 
  
                                                        
1 http://www.eenvandaag.nl/uploads/doc/Klantvriendelijkheid_Banken_01.pdf 
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2. Banking culture 
 
2.1 Organizational culture 
 
Hill and Jones (2001) define organizational culture as “the specific collection of values 
and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control 
the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the 
organization”.  De Nederlandsche Bank uses a typology of dimensions of 
organizational culture. Examples are organizational behaviour 
(consistency/balance/role model in the sector), transparency to the world outside, 
and sanctioning non-compliant behaviour (DNB, 2009). This typology parallels the 
literature about organizational behaviour as expressed in messages and symbols  
(Schein, 2004; Taylor, 2005).  
 
(Bik, 2011) distinguishes three elements of organizational culture: the behaviour of 
leaders (walk the talk, welcoming criticism), symbols and decisions around the 
distribution of scarce resources such as time and money (workload, bonuses, solving 
ethical dilemma's), and the systems and structures in an organization (performance 
measurement, targets, compliance). 
 
 
2.2 Types of culture 
  
Organizational culture links messages to behaviour based on norms and values. This 
reveals that ethics is an important basis for culture. We distinguish three types of 
ethics (Den Hartog en Verburg, 2004; van Staveren, 2007): 
 Utilitarianism 
 Moral duties (deontology) 
 Ethics of care 
  
Utilitarianism was developed by Jeremy Bentham, who formulated it as the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. Today, it is the moral basis of neoclassical 
economics, with its utility functions and welfare analysis. The theory postulates that 
economic agents strive for individual utility maximization, and hence, economic 
behaviour is solely judged on the basis of its individual, subjective outcomes. Banks 
draw heavily on this theory, for example by setting targets and providing incentives  
in their performance management  (Crespo and van Staveren, 2011, p.7). 
 
Deontology, or what we term moral duties, goes back to Immanuel Kant. This ethical 
approach is not concerned with consequences but with principles, the rights and 
duties of people toward each other. Key in moral duties is human dignity: the 
individual should never be turned into an instrument but should always be treated 
as an end in itself. In economics, moral duties are expressed as constraints to the 
behaviour of individuals and firms by laws, rules, and social norms (van Staveren, 
2007, p. 24). In banking culture this is expressed as regulation and compliance, 
including a bankers' oath. 
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The ethics of care is partly based on Aristotle's virtue ethics, namely on the 
interpersonal virtues that are crucial in maintaining relationships. Taking 
responsibility for relationships by responding to human vulnerability is what matters 
in the ethics of care. Hence, it is a contextual ethics, in which neither the outcome, 
nor the starting point are dominant but the process of caring (van Staveren, 2001; 
Wærness, 2009). Nelson (2010) has argued that the ethics of care often makes part 
of organizational cultures, but often implicitly and not recognized. It is expressed, for 
example, in a long-term focus on stakeholder interests and openness to critique and 
feedback. In the financial sector this may be expressed by a stronger connection 
between the interests of clients, employees, and owners (van Staveren, 2013). In a 
caring organizational culture, employees are rewarded when they make themselves 
vulnerable rather than receiving scorn or risk being fired when being open about 
critique, dilemma's and mistakes. 
 
 
2.3 Does culture matter? 
 
Culture, not only at the firm level but also at the sector level, can be a stronger 
driver of change than strategy. An example is the increase of investment banking in 
the 1990s up to the financial crisis, with an expanding number of services for large 
clients. This shift away from commercial banking and an earnings model based on 
spreads to an earnings model based on fees and asset transactions was not so much 
a conscious strategy but part and parcel of a cultural shift away from partnerships 
and long-term client relationships (van den Brink, 2003, pp. 10-11).  
 
But culture is also a non-price competition dimension for clients to select the bank 
they want to trust their money with. A recent consumer study by Oracle (Mazzucato, 
2013, p. 14) among a wide variety of firms in the US has revealed that 89% decided 
to buy from a different firm when disappointed in the services of a firm. In the long 
run, an organizational culture that is client-oriented and trust-based appears to be 
key for operational success and market share, according to the same study (p. 16). 
 
Another finding from the literature is that a consistent culture has a positive effect 
on a firm's performance, as compared to an inconsistent culture (Berrone, Surraco 
and Tribo, 2007). Sorensen (2002) finds a similar result in a detailed study of large 
firms operating in 18 different markets. The findings point out that shared norms 
and values in a firm are correlated with a more stable performance. One standard 
deviation decline in a "strong culture" is correlated with 30% more volatility in return 
on investment (idem, p. 84). Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) have analysed the 
effect of social and ecological sustainability in organizational cultures on 
performance. They found that a culture of sustainability links individual performance 
to sustainability targets, focuses on a market with clients seeking sustainable values, 
and provides strong transparency in the non-financial variables of the firm's 
operations. The study concludes that firms with a culture focusing on internal and 
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external sustainability show better long-term financial performance than other firms 
(idem, p. 33).  
 
 
2.4 Culture in the financial sector 
 
SFL has carried out a joint study with Motivaction in 2012 about the mentality of 
financial professionals in the Netherlands. The study shows that financial 
professionals have on average a different mentality profile than professionals in 
other sectors. Their profile is characterized by a relatively large focus on their own 
interest, limited social responsibility, less ecological concerns, and less critical 
attitude towards people in higher positions. Interestingly, this average mentality 
profile matches quite well the general perception of bankers and banking culture by 
the Dutch population. 
 
In 2012 the central bank did a study of banking culture at the top of Dutch banks, 
titled "Leading by example". The report shows that board members are not well 
aware of their group behaviour. They hardly question each other's behaviour. There 
is very limited correction of each others' behaviour when this is unacceptable or 
ineffective; there is insufficient space to listen to each other and to criticise each 
other (group think); there is no institutionalized framework for generating 
alternative points of views; and the leadership style is often characterized by 
dominant leadership, which often results in ignoring advise from other board 
members. 
 
These results parallel findings from the literature about the financial sector's culture, 
in particular the gap between the walk and talk of the leadership. Powell et al. 
(2011) show that walk and talk often do not match. And the ethical attitudes of the 
leadership appears to be guiding the ethical attitudes of the employees (idem, p. 
450). As a consequence, the gap that employees experience between walk and talk 
often results in cynicism, as O'Brien and Meadows (2003) show. They also find that 
lack of clarity and the often quite abstract language of the vision is experienced by 
employees as a constraint. For example, many firms use a scorecard to measure 
progress in implementing the vision without knowing how worker satisfaction affects 
client satisfaction and how both contribute to financial performance. 
 
The study by Burks and Krupka (2012) of an American bank focuses on the reasons 
behind the gap between the leadership and the employees who give financial advise 
and sell products to clients. It points not only at miscommunication but more 
importantly at ethical disagreements, in particular when the bank has clearly made a 
mistake and has covered it up. A study by Amabile and Kramer (2012) about 
leadership and motivation indicates that leaders announce wonderful goals but in 
the meantime focus on cost reductions. This undermines the intrinsic motivation of 
workers, the researchers conclude. In other words, taking clients interests seriously 
implies a consistency between walk and talk by a bank's leadership. 
 
 10 
Another study on intrinsic motivation has analysed its effect on business 
performance. Deci en Ryan (2004) show that business performance depends on the 
extent to which employees feel satisfaction on the basis of the intrinsic values they 
cherish (competency development, autonomy, and engagement). The researchers 
have tested whether this satisfaction depends on the level of autonomy that 
employees have (idem, p. 2061). Their survey among 528 employees of a large 
American investment bank shows a positive relationship between experiencing 
autonomy and satisfaction of intrinsic values. Moreover, there also appeared to be a 
positive correlation between the satisfaction of intrinsic values and business 
performance (idem, p. 2062-2064). 
 
As an extension of employee-focused research, Paulin et al. (1999) have studied also 
clients of commercial banks in the US, Mexico and Canada. They asked clients to 
rank banks according to their level of effectiveness. The results indicate a strong 
positive relationship between engagement around the values of a firm and external 
effectiveness. At the same time, a competitive culture within a firm showed a 
negative relationship with external effectiveness. Hence, a banking culture founded 
upon shared values seems better for a bank's performance than one based upon a 
culture of competition.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Business culture is understood as a consistent relationship between message and 
behaviour with an ethical foundation around shared values. The literature that we 
discussed in this chapter shows that cultures that show less emphasis on 
competition, financial targets, and dominant leadership generally lead to more 
effective organizations with better financial performance. The reaction of 
supervisory bodies to the crisis was predominantly driven by an ethics of moral 
duties: detailed regulation, compliance culture, bankers' oath, and a proposal for 
disciplinary legal measures. The literature suggests that a stronger shift in banking 
culture away from the pre-crisis culture requires more attention to the ethics of 
care. The implication for changes in Dutch banking culture is a move away from 
highly profitable product innovations, pre-defined targets, and compliance, to the 
development of team spirit based on high trust, cooperation, and critical feedback 
towards a sustainable client relationship in which client interests are genuinely 
central. 
 
The survey results confirm this picture from the international academic literature. 
On the one hand, the results highlight the dominant Dutch banking culture, where 
utilitarianism and moral duties keep each other hostage. Whereas on the other 
hand, they point out that there clearly is a good starting point for further developing 
an ethics of care in Dutch banks. 
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3. Methodology 
 
We have sent out the questionnaire online to all 7,000 labour union members 
working in the banking sector, in June 2014. The survey could be filled in only once 
per ip-address, entirely anonymously. The questions concern the year 2013, and 
sometimes 2012 as well, when explicitly indicated in a question. We have discarded 
the responses from former union members as well as forms that were incomplete. 
This has led to a net total of 617 completed online survey forms. 
 
Due to the channel of labour unions, the average respondent is predominantly a 
middle- or lower level employee. They are both front office and back office workers 
and team leaders. This composition of the sample is confirmed by the average 
earnings over the year 2013. 47% earns less than 4,000 per month and 93% earns 
less than 7,000 euro per month. 7% earns 7,000 euro or more. 40% of the 
respondents has direct client contact, 43% has (almost) no client contact and works 
predominantly in back office jobs. As a consequence of this composition, the results 
of the survey should be interpreted as the voice of the ordinary, or average, bank 
employee, and not that of the leadership or highly-paid specialists.  
 
The sample size of 617 is distributed as follows over the three labour unions: 
FNV = 409 
CNV = 136 
DeUnie = 51 
other unions = 21 
 
The sample covers 9% of the population of around 7,000 bank employees who are 
member of a labour union. The level of confidence of the sample is 95% and the 
confidence interval is 4% (3.79% exactly). This implies that the answers to the 
questions are in a range of plus and minus 2% of the value that is measured and 
have a probability of 95% to express the true value. With these statistical measures, 
the sample is representative for all labour union members working in banks in the 
Netherlands. 
 
The results are reported in two types of tables. First, we present the frequency 
tables for every question. This is the most important category of tables. Next, we 
present some cross tabulations, which show statistically significant relationship 
between relevant variables. We present these correlations with the results of the 
Pearson Chi-square test2.  
 
We have also published a summary and interpretation of our main results in the 
Dutch economic policy journal ESB, in November 20143. 
  
                                                        
2 When the value of the Ch0square test > 95 (that is 95% confidene level) and the 
probability is p<0.05, than the measured result is statistically significant. 
3 Irene van Staveren en Rens van Tilburg, ‘Klantbelang centraal bij medewerker maar 
niet in bankcultuur’, ESB 99 (4697), 6 November 2014, pp. 696-699. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Frequency distributions 
 
4.1.1 Background characteristics 
 
The first five tables show the results for the background characteristics of average 
Dutch bank employees (front office and back office, lower and medium job levels): 
sex, age, earnings, bank, and extent of client contact. The results indicate that the 
background characteristics of the respondents of this survey are not very different 
from those of all bank employees in the Netherlands, as can be found in annual 
reports and labour statistics. 
 
 
1. Male-female distribution 
What is your sex? number percentage 
male 370 59,97 
female 247 40,03 
total 617 100,00 
 
60% of the respondents is male and 40% is female. This seems representative for the 
lower and middle level positions in Dutch banks.  
 
 
2. Age distribution  
What is your age? number percentage 
under 50 years 266 43,11 
50 years and older 351 56,89 
total 617 100,00 
 
43% is younger than 50 years and 57% is 50 years or older. This implies that the 
respondents of this survey are slightly older than the average Dutch bank employee. 
 
 
3. Fulltime monthly salary including variable pay in euro 
What was your fulltime monthly salary in 
2013? 
 
number 
 
percentage 
 
cumulative 
less than 4,000 291 47,16 47,16 
4,000-7,000 280 45,38 92,54 
7,000-10,000 39 6,32 98,87 
10.000 or above 7 1,13 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
Only a small minority (1.1%) earns 10,000 euro or more per month. Another small 
group (6.3%) earns between 7,000 and 10,000 euro per month. Hence, 7% of the 
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respondents earns a salary (including variable pay) of 7,000 euro or more. 47% earns 
less than 4,000 euro, while 45% earns between 4,000 and 7,000 euro per month. 
 
 
4. Banks 
At which bank are you employed? number percentage 
ABN Amro bank 188 30,47 
ING bank 153 24,80 
Rabobank 206 33,39 
other 70 100,00 
total 617 100,00 
 
The large majority (89%) is employed at one of the three top-banks. Most of the 
respondents are employed by Rabobank (34%), while 30% works at ABN Amro bank 
and 25% at ING. 
 
 
5. Contact with clients 
Do you have direct contact with clients? number percentage 
direct contact 249 40,36 
sometimes contact 102 16,53 
no direct contact 266 43,11 
total 617 100,00 
 
40% of the respondents has direct client contact and 17% sometimes. Together this 
is 57%. The other 43% are probably back-office employees and team-leaders and 
managers. 
 
 
4.1.2 Organisational culture 
 
The next series of tables presents the results for the organizational culture at banks. 
The key variables are atmosphere, work pressure, dilemmas, trust, mentality of 
colleagues, and openness. 
 
 
6. Atmosphere 
Do you experience the atmosphere in your team as 
engaged and loyal? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
yes 381 61,75 
sometimes  174 28,20 
no 62 10,05 
total 617 100,00 
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The majority states that they experience the atmosphere as engaged and loyal: 62%, 
and 28% sometimes. This indicates that the majority of banks have a good 
atmosphere. 
 
 
7. Work pressure 
is it sometimes difficult to serve client interests due to  
increased work pressure? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
often 247 40,03 
sometimes 261 42,30 
never 80 12,97 
don't know 29 4,70 
total 617 100,00 
 
 
Many employees experience work pressure as a constraint to serve client interests: 
40% often and 42% sometimes (together 82%). That is quite much. Tables 8a - 8d 
show the responses to questions about the reasons for the increased work pressure. 
It was not required to answer these sub-questions, so that the total number of 
responses is lower than 617 for these questions. 
 
 
8a. Reasons of work pressure: cost reductions 
Work pressure is caused by cost 
reductions 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 171 49,57 49,57 
agree 116 33,62 83,19 
neutral 42 12,17 95,36 
disagree 14 4,06 99,42 
strongly disagree 2 0,58 100,00 
total 345 100,00  
 
 
8b. Reasons of work pressure: regulation 
Work pressure is caused by regulation  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 153 44,35 44,35 
agree 116 33,62 77,97 
neutral 54 15,65 93,62 
disagree 16 4,64 98,26 
strongly disagree 6 1,74 100,00 
total 345 100,00  
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8c. Reasons of work pressure: regular trainings 
Work pressure is caused by regular 
trainings 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 64 18,71 18,71 
agree 113 33,04 51,75 
neutral 92 26,90 78,65 
disagree 63 18,42 97,08 
strongly disagree 10 2,92 100,00 
total 342 100,00  
 
8d. Reasons of work pressure: commercial pressures 
Work pressure is caused by 
commercial pressures 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 91 26,61 26,61 
agree 98 28,65 55,26 
neutral 100 29,24 84,50 
disagree 43 12,57 97,08 
strongly disagree 10 2,92 100,00 
total 342 100,00  
 
 
The major reasons for the high work pressure that employees experience are cost 
reductions (83%) and regulation (78%). 
 
Questions 9a - 9d are about the way employees deal with ethical dilemmas. 
 
 
9a. Ethical dilemmas: solve alone 
I solve ethical dilemmas alone  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 31 5,02 5,02 
agree 184 29,82 34,85 
neutral 187 30,31 65,15 
disagree 171 27,71 92,87 
strongly disagree 44 7,13 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
9b. Ethical dilemmas: discuss with manager 
I discuss ethical dilemmas with my 
manager 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 55 8,91 8,91 
agree 318 51,54 60,45 
neutral 151 24,47 84,93 
disagree 73 11,83 96,76 
strongly disagree 20 3,24 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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9c. Ethical dilemmas: compliance 
Ethical dilemmas are solved through 
compliance procedures 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 138 22,37 22,37 
agree 311 50,41 72,77 
neutral 128 20,75 93,52 
disagree 33 5,35 98,87 
strongly disagree 7 1,13 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
9d. Ethical dilemmas: ethics committee 
Ethical dilemmas are judged by an 
ethics committee 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 23 3,73 3,73 
agree 123 19,94 23,66 
neutral 296 47,97 71,64 
disagree 113 18,31 89,95 
strongly disagree 62 10,05 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
Ethical dilemmas are addressed as follows:  
 35% finds a solution alone 
 60% discusses it with manager 
 73% follows the rules (compliance) 
 24% shifts them to an ethics committee 
 
These results are a bit alarming. First, a third tries to solve a dilemma alone, without 
discussion. That is not transparent and does not ensure that all interests are taken 
into account in a balanced way. Second, three quarters thinks that dilemmas can be 
solved through rules. But it the unique and contextual character of an ethical 
dilemma makes that rules do not apply. Hence, the responses to this question 
indicate that there may be insufficient insight into the character of ethical dilemmas 
and the most adequate way to address these. 
 
The next question concerns the trust in banks: in the team, the manager, and the 
bank as an organization. 
 
 
10a. Trust in the team 
I experience trust in my team  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 105 17,02 17.,02 
agree 280 45,38 62,40 
neutral 123 19,94 82,33 
disagree 76 12,32 94,65 
 17 
strongly disagree 33 5,35 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
10b. Trust in the manager 
I experience trust in my manager  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 72 11,67 11,67 
agree 210 34,04 45,71 
neutral 158 25,61 71,31 
disagree 111 17,99 89,30 
strongly disagree 66 10,70 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
10c. Trust in the bank 
I experience trust in my bank  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 10 1,62 1,62 
agree 88 14,26 15,88 
neutral 243 39,38 55,27 
disagree 196 31,77 87,03 
strongly disagree 80 12,97 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
Of the average bank employee, 62% has trust in the team, 46% in the manager and 
16% in the bank as a whole. Hence, the level of trust declines with an increase in the 
distance to others in the bank. This is also clear from the negative responses. 17% 
has no trust in the team, 29% has no trust in the manager and 45% has no trust in 
the bank. These results point out that it is not only Dutch society which has low trust 
in banks and bankers, but also bankers themselves have low trust levels in banks. 
 
The next question is about the preference for a work atmosphere. 
 
 
11a. Competitive atmosphere 
I like to work in a competitive 
atmosphere 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 60 9,72 9,72 
agree 37 6,00 15,72 
neutral 174 28,20 43,92 
disagree 235 38,09 82,01 
strongly disagree 111 17,99 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
11b. Structured atmosphere 
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I like to work in a structured 
atmosphere 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 196 31,77 31,77 
agree 247 40,03 71,80 
neutral 134 21,72 93,52 
disagree 33 5,35 98,87 
strongly disagree 7 1,13 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
11c. Warm collegial atmosphere 
I like to work in a warm atmosphere  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 236 38,25 38,25 
agree 333 53,97 92,22 
neutral 36 5,83 98,06 
disagree 7 1,13 99,19 
strongly disagree 5 0,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
When asked about their preference for a work atmosphere, 16% states that they 
prefer a competitive atmosphere, 72% prefers a structured atmosphere, while 92% 
prefers a warm atmosphere. This shows a clear preferences in favour of a warm, 
collegial atmosphere rather than competition. 
 
The next question concerns the type of colleagues one works with.  
 
12a Colleagues: result orientation 
My bank predominantly employs 
people who are result oriented 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 108 17,50 17,50 
agree 319 51,70 69,21 
neutral 141 22,85 92,06 
disagree 46 7,46 99,51 
strongly disagree 3 0,49 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
12b. Colleagues: procedure orientation 
My bank predominantly employs 
people who are procedure oriented 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 142 23,01 23,01 
agree 301 48,78 71,80 
neutral 133 21,56 93,35 
disagree 36 5,83 99,19 
strongly disagree 5 0,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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12c. Colleagues: relation orientation 
My bank predominantly employs 
people who are relation oriented 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 58 9,40 9,40 
agree 250 40,52 49,92 
neutral 189 30,63 80,55 
disagree 98 15,88 96,43 
strongly disagree 22 3,57 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
In the view of the respondents, banks predominantly employ people who are results 
oriented (69%) and procedure oriented (72%). Whereas 50% assess their colleagues 
as relation oriented. This composition conflicts with the preferred work atmosphere 
as became clear from the answers to the previous question. The respondents prefer 
a warm atmosphere but they see the majority of their colleagues being result 
oriented. In other words, the dominant culture is not consistent with the culture that 
bank employees prefer. 
 
The next question is about openness and development.  
 
 
13a.  Information is shared 
Information is shared  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 28 4,54 4,54 
agree 236 38,25 42,79 
neutral 161 26,09 68,8 
disagree 150 24,31 93,19 
strongly disagree 42 6,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
13b. Space to learn 
There is much space to learn  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 80 12,97 12,97 
agree 315 51,05 64,02 
neutral 129 20,91 84,93 
disagree 75 12,16 97,08 
strongly disagree 18 2,92 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
13c. Appreciation of vulnerability 
There is appreciation when you make 
yourself vulnerable in meetings 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 19 3,08 3,08 
agree 152 24,64 27,72 
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neutral 169 27,39 55,11 
disagree 202 32,74 87,84 
strongly disagree 75 12,16 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
13d. Space for feelings and imagination 
There is space for feelings and 
imagination 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 15 2,43 2,42 
agree 167 27,07 29,50 
neutral 190 30,79 60,29 
disagree 191 30,96 91,25 
strongly disagree 54 8,75 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
13.e Space for public debate 
I feel free to engage in the public 
debate about banks  
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 35 5,67 5,67 
agree 205 33,23 38,90 
neutral 180 29,17 68,07 
disagree 155 25,12 93,19 
strongly disagree 42 6,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
The experience of openness is mixed. 43% states that information is widely shared, 
whereas 31% responds that this is not the case. A majority indicates that there is 
space to learn (64% against 15% not). 28% feels the space to make oneself 
vulnerable in meetings but 45% not. 30% indicates that there is space for feelings 
and imagination but 40% not. 39% feels free to engage in the public debate about 
banks in the Netherlands but 32% not. 
 
Although a majority experiences space for self-development, only a minority 
experiences the space to express one's feelings, imagination and vulnerability and to 
engage in public debate. So, individual skills-development seems not to be a 
problem, but social interaction seems to be rather constrained when it comes to 
emotions.  
 
 
4.1.3 Leadership 
 
The next series of tables show the results for the leadership in banks.  
 
Tables 14a and 14b measure the difference between walk and talk of the leadership. 
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14a. Leadership's talk about client interests 
The leadership recognizes the 
centrality of client interests in words 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 127 20,58 20,58 
agree 339 54,94 75,53 
neutral 83 13,45 88,98 
disagree 47 7,62 96,60 
strongly disagree 21 3,40 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
14b. Leadership's walk about client interests 
The leadership recognizes the 
centrality of client interests in deeds 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 30 4,86 4,86 
agree 140 22,69 27,55 
neutral 182 29,50 57,05 
disagree 174 28,20 85,25 
strongly disagree 91 14,75 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
76% of the respondents states that the leadership talks about client interests, 
whereas only 28% sees these words translated in deeds. 43% states that the 
leadership does not walk the talk. Hence, there is a large gap between walk and talk. 
The risk of this is cynicism about the leadership and the strategy. This is not 
productive for a consistent and widely shared culture. 
 
 
15. Top earnings 
I think the earnings of the top in my 
bank is: 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
too low 7 1,13 1,13 
correct 115 18,64 19,77 
to high 350 56,73 76,50 
no opinion 145 23,50 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
19% agrees with the level of earnings of the top in their bank, 1% even states that it 
is too low. 57%, a majority, thinks that top salaries are too high. Almost a quarter 
expresses no opinion on this sensitive issue, that has led several times to public 
outrage in Dutch society and politics. 
 
 
16.  Space for own initiative  
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There is plenty space for own 
initiative 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 47 7,62 7,62 
agree 231 37,44 45,06 
neutral 165 26,74 71,80 
disagree 142 23,01 94,81 
strongly disagree 32 5,19 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
45% of the employees experiences space for taking initiative. This is slightly less than 
half of the respondents.  
 
17. Manager is open to criticism 
My manager is open to criticism number per cent 
yes 240 38,90 
sometimes 208 33,71 
no 155 25,12 
no opinion 14 2,27 
total 617 100,00 
 
 
39% feels that management is open to criticism and 34% feels that this is sometimes 
the case. 25% experiences no openness to criticism of the leadership. So it's a 
minority who consistently experiences openness. This limits the opportunity to give 
feedback, and hence, the self-correcting capacity of banks. 
 
 
4.1.4 Trust of society 
 
The next series of tables shows the results that are likely to affect trust of society in 
banks. 
 
 
18. Tension between client interest and products 
I experience a tension between client interest and products 
offered by my bank number per cent 
often 72 11,67 
sometimes 304 49,27 
never 122 19,77 
no opinion 119 19,29 
total 617 100,00 
 
The average bank employee experiences often a tension (12%) or sometimes a 
tension (49%) between client interest and the products that his or her bank offers. 
So, a majority of employees feel that a product their bank offers may be in conflict 
with the interests of clients. 
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19. Sales of products that one does not support 
In the past two years, I have sold products that I myself do 
not support number per cent 
yes 16 2,59 
no 331 53,65 
no opinion 270 43,76 
total 617 100,00 
 
 
Only 3% has sold products over the past two years that one does not support, and 
54% not. The other 44% probably has no direct client contact. 
 
The next question is about the bankers oath. 
 
21a. Bankers oath for the top 
The bankers oath should be limited to the top number per cent 
no 218 35,33 
yes 385 62,40 
no opinion 14 2,27 
total 617 100,00 
 
21b. Bankers oath for all managers 
The bankers oath should be for all managers number per cent 
no 204 33,06 
yes 390 63,21 
no opinion 23 3,73 
total 617 100,00 
 
21c. Bankers oath for all managers and employees who have direct contact with 
clients 
The bankers oath should be for all managers and those with 
client contact number per cent 
no 244 39,55 
yes 336 54,46 
no opinion 37 6,00 
total 617 100,00 
 
21d. Bankers oath for all employees 
The bankers oath should be for all employees number per cent 
no 313 50,73 
yes 266 43,11 
no opinion 38 6,16 
total 617 100,00 
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62% of the respondents feel that the bankers oath should be limited to the top of 
the bank and 63% thinks all managers should be subject to the oath. 54% wants to 
include everyone with client contact. But a minority (43%) favours the oath to be 
taken by all employees and a slight majority not (51%). So, a majority of bank 
employees feels that the bankers oath is more something for managers than for 
ordinary bank employees. Some of the answers to the open questions clarify why. 
 
 
22. Behavioural rules and the client 
Do you agree that behavioural rules will help to put client 
interest more centrally? number per cent 
yes 143 23,18 
no 352 57,05 
no opinion 122 19,77 
total 617 100,00 
 
 
A majority (57%) does not agree that the behavioural rules as proposed by the Dutch 
Banking Association (NVB) will help to achieve more focus on client interest. 
 
 
23. Disciplinary legal measures 
What do you think about disciplinary legal 
measures for bankers? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 61 9,89 9,89 
agree 206 33,39 43,27 
neutral 124 20,10 63,37 
disagree 104 16,86 80,23 
strongly disagree 93 15,07 95,30 
total 29 4,70 100,00 
strongly agree 617 100,00  
 
 
43% support the NVB-plan to introduce disciplinary legal measures, yet, 32% does 
not. 
25% is neutral. This indicates that there is not much enthusiasm for the NVB 
proposal. 
 
 
24. Earnings 
What do you think about your earnings 
relative to comparable professions?  
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
generous 154 24,96 24,96 
similar 340 55,11 80,06 
too low 76 12,32 92,38 
no opinion 47 7,62 100,00 
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total 617 100,00  
 
 
There is a general positive view about the earnings in the Dutch banking sector by 
bankers themselves. 25% finds their earnings generous and 55% similar to that in 
comparable professions. Only 12% assess their earnings as relatively low. This means 
that 80% is satisfied with their earnings as compared to similar professions. 
 
 
25. Wage freeze 
How do you think about the wage freeze  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 14 2,27 2,27 
agree 78 12,64 14,91 
neutral 210 34,04 48,95 
disagree 235 38,09 87,03 
strongly disagree 80 12,97 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
The respondents are less satisfied with the wage freeze. 51% disagrees, 15% agrees 
and the rest is neutral. This implies that although a large majority is satisfied with 
their wage, about half of the respondents likes to see a salary raise anyway. Perhaps 
because they think that in other sectors salaries go up. 
 
Tables 261 - 26f show the results about variable pay. 
 
 
26a. Variable pay: rightful compensation for effort 
Do you think that variable pay is a rightful 
compensation for effort? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 39 6,32 6,32 
agree 186 30,15 36,47 
neutral 177 28,69 65,15 
disagree 150 24,31 89,47 
strongly disagree 65 10,53 100,00 
totaal 617 100,00  
 
26b. Variable pay: motivating 
Do you think that variable pay motivates?  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 34 5,51 5,51 
agree 210 24,04 39,55 
neutral 132 21,39 60,94 
disagree 169 27,39 88,33 
strongly disagree 72 11,67 100,00 
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total 617 100,00  
 
26c. Variable pay: indicates reward 
Do you think that variable pay indicates 
reward? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 61 9,89 9,89 
agree 260 42,14 52,03 
neutral 131 21,23 73,26 
disagree 122 19,77 93,03 
strongly disagree 43 6,97 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
26d. Variable pay: helps to attract the best bankers 
Do you think that variable pay helps to attract 
the best bankers? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 15 2,43 2,43 
agree 111 17,99 20,42 
neutral 152 24,64 45,06 
disagree 225 36,47 81,52 
strongly disagree 114 18,48 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
26e. Variable pay: better not due to public criticism 
Do you think that banks are better off without 
variable pay due to public criticism? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 135 21,88 21,88 
agree 202 32,74 54,62 
neutral 120 19,45 74,07 
disagree 127 20,58 94,65 
strongly disagree 33 5,35 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
26f. Variable pay: can result in short term focus 
Do you think that variable pay can result in 
short term focus? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 188 30,47 30,47 
agree 251 40,68 71,15 
neutral 102 16,53 87,68 
disagree 67 10,86 98,54 
strongly disagree 9 1,46 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
The respondents have the following attitudes toward variable pay: 
- 36% feel it is justified but 35% not 
- 40% feels it motivates but 39% not 
- 52% feels it is a signal of reward but 27% not 
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- 55% thinks it will not help to attract the best bankers but 20% do think it will 
- 55% thinks the sector is better off without variable pay and 26% does not 
- 71% fears that it leads to short-termism and 12% does not think so 
 
The results show a dilemma. On the one hand, close to half of the respondents (36-
52%) favours variable pay in general, while at the same time a majority (55-71%) 
recognizes negative side-effects for the bank. Most Dutch top-banks have 
abandoned variable pay (except for ABN Amro bank). Not so much from an HRM 
perspective but as a response to public criticism. This signals at least openness to an 
ethics of care perspective, even if the motivation is largely utilitarian. 
 
 
 
4.1.5 Client interest 
 
 
27. Service provision since the crisis 
Do you think that service provision has 
changed since the crisis? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 200 32,41 32,41 
agree 174 28,20 60,62 
neutral 188 30,47 91,09 
disagree 55 8,91 100,00 
strongly disagree 55 30,47  
total 617 100,00  
 
 
32% sees an improvement in service provisioning, 28% finds no difference and 30% 
rather notes a deterioration of services. This rather even split between the answers 
indicates that there has been no clear improvement of banking services to clients 
since the crisis. 
 
 
28. Importance of client relation 
What do you think about the relationship with 
clients? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
very important 276 44,73 44,73 
important 97 15,72 60,45 
not important 2 0,32 60,78 
not applicable because I have no direct client 
contact 
242 39,22 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
The respondents in general find the relationship with clients important. 45% finds it 
very important and 16% finds it important (together 61%). 
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The next series of tables asks about performance targets, an important HRM 
instrument in banks. 
 
 
29a. Performance targets and client interest: no targets 
Having no targets is the best for clients  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 99 16,05 16,05 
agree 112 18,15 34,20 
neutral 194 31,44 65,64 
disagree 170 27,55 93,19 
strongly disagree 42 6,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
29b. Performance targets and client interest: targets for client satisfaction 
Targets for client satisfaction are in the 
interest of clients 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 184 29,82 29,82 
agree 318 51,54 81,36 
neutral 72 11,67 93,03 
disagree 31 5,02 98,06 
strongly disagree 12 1,94 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
29c. Performance targets and client interest: sales targets 
Sales targets are in the interest of clients  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 6 0,97 0,97 
agree 64 10,37 11,35 
neutral 157 25,45 36,79 
disagree 276 44,73 81,52 
strongly disagree 114 18,48 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
29d. Performance targets and client interest: a diversity of targets and long term 
focus 
Diversity of targets and long term focus 
are in the interest of clients 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 91 14,75 14,75 
agree 283 45,87 60,62 
neutral 179 29,01 89,63 
disagree 41 6,65 96,27 
strongly disagree 23 3,73 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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The relationship between client interest and performance targets is assessed as 
follows by the respondents: 
- 34% feels that performance targets are not in the interest of clients while another 
34% thinks they are 
- 81% thinks that targets for client satisfaction are indeed in the interest of clients 
and only 7% does not 
- 11% thinks that sales targets are in the interest of clients but 63% does not 
- 61% feels that a diversity of targets with a long term focus are in the interest of 
clients, but 10% does not 
 
In short, the respondents are confident that a diversity of long targets are in the 
interest of clients while sales targets are not. 
 
 
The next series of questions concern the social role of banks. 
 
 
30a. Social role of bank: make profit 
The social role of my bank is to make profit for 
the shareholders 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 27 4,38 4,38 
agree 115 18,64 23,01 
neutral 185 29,98 53,00 
disagree 183 29,66 82,66 
strongly disagree 107 17,34 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
30b. Social role of bank: client satisfaction 
The social role of my bank is to have satisfied 
clients 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 208 33,71 33,71 
agree 338 54,78 88,49 
neutral 54 8,75 97,24 
disagree 13 2,11 99,35 
strongly disagree 4 0,65 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
30c. Social role of bank: client interest 
The social role of my bank is to serve client 
interests 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 233 37,76 37,76 
agree 336 54,46 92,22 
neutral 39 6,32 98,54 
disagree 7 1,13 99,68 
strongly disagree 2 0,32 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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30d. Social role of bank: serve the interests of all stakeholders 
The social role of my bank is to serve the 
interests of all stakeholders 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 151 24,47 24,47 
agree 291 47,16 71,64 
neutral 130 21,07 92,71 
disagree 27 4,38 97,08 
strongly disagree 18 2,92 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
The social role of a bank is explained as follows: 
- making profit: 23% 
- client satisfaction: 88% 
- client interest: 92% 
- interests of all stakeholders: 72% 
 
A large majority puts clients first in the social role of their bank. However, profits are 
still mentioned by a quarter of the respondents. 
 
 
4.1.6 Performance management 
 
31a. Banker's job: nice career 
The job of banker is a nice career  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 28 4,54 4,54 
agree 265 42,95 47,49 
neutral 230 37,28 84,76 
disagree 73 11,83 96,60 
strongly disagree 21 3,40 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
31b. Banker's job: craft 
The job of banker is a craft  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 50 8,10 8,10 
agree 215 34,85 42,95 
neutral 188 30,47 73,42 
disagree 135 21,88 95,30 
strongly disagree 29 4,70 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
31c. Banker's job: service to society 
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The job of banker is to serve society  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 70 11,35 11,35 
agree 312 50,57 61,91 
neutral 135 21,88 83,79 
disagree 86 13,94 97,73 
strongly disagree 14 2,27 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
31d. Banker's job: over-regulated 
The job of banker is over-regulated an no fun 
anymore 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 140 22,69 22,69 
agree 201 32,58 55,27 
neutral 138 22,37 77,63 
disagree 121 19,61 97,24 
strongly disagree 17 2,76 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
31e. Banker's job: I prefer to work in a different sector 
The job of banker does not suit me anymore, I 
would rather work in a different sector 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 46 7,46 7,46 
agree 103 16,69 24,15 
neutral 192 31,12 55,27 
disagree 207 33,55 88,82 
strongly disagree 69 11,18 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
The attitudes toward the profession of banker, or bank employee, the respondents 
express the following views: 
 
- nearly half still finds it a nice career: 47% 
- 43% considers it a craft 
- 62% thinks it serves society 
- a majority of 55% finds it over-regulated 
- a quarter would rather work in a different sector: 24% 
 
 
When we compare the answers to this question with those about client interest, we 
find a smaller percentage for those who think the job serves society. Less than half 
seems to enjoy the profession as a career or craft, while more than half finds it over-
regulated. A quarter prefers to work somewhere else. 
 
 
32. Increased regulation 
 32 
The increase in regulation is justified  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
yes 531 86,06 86,06 
nee o59 9,56 95,62 
no opinion 27 4,38 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
The bank employees are realistic about regulation. 86% agrees with the increase in 
regulation. This may be seen as a support for DNB and AFM, and a recognition of the 
importance of moral duties towards society. 
 
 
33. Autonomy 
How much autonomy do you have to be able 
to do your job in an optimal manner? 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
very much 42 6,81 6,81 
much 219 35,49 42,30 
neutral 201 32,58 74,88 
limited 128 20,75 95,62 
very limited 27 4,38 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
A minority of 42% feel they have the autonomy to do their job in an optimal manner. 
25% states that they have limited autonomy, while a third is neutral. 
 
These results indicate that bank employees in general experience not much  
autonomy. This suggests that they experience a constraint on their own freedom 
and responsibility to adequately serve client interests. 
 
This finding leads to the next item, namely targets. 
 
 
34a. Performance and targets 
My performance is controlled by targets 
without variable pay but with consequences 
for my career 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 44 7,13 7,13 
agree 226 36,63 43,76 
neutral 170 27,55 71,31 
disagree 133 21,56 92,87 
strongly disagree 44 7,13 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
34b. Performance and variable pay 
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My performance is controlled by targets which 
are linked to variable pay 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 24 3,89 3,89 
agree 160 25,93 29,82 
neutral 134 21,72 51,54 
disagree 181 29,34 80,88 
strongly disagree 118 19,12 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
34c. Performance and innovation 
My performance is stimulated by having the 
space to innovate 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 40 6,48 6,48 
agree 226 36,63 43,11 
neutral 181 29,34 72,45 
disagree 129 20,91 93,35 
strongly disagree 41 100,00 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
34d. Performance and client relations 
My performance is stimulated by having the 
responsibility to maintain client relations 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 33 5,35 5,35 
agree 157 25,45 30,79 
neutral 256 41,49 72,29 
disagree 117 18,96 91,25 
strongly disagree 54 8,75 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
The performance of bank employees is controlled as follows: 
- by targets: 44% (29% not) 
- by targets and variable pay: 30% (48% not) 
- by space for innovation: 43% (28% not) 
- by the responsibility for client relations: 31% (28% not) 
 
The combined answers to questions a and b indicate that 74% of the respondents is 
controlled by targets - with and without variable pay. That is a high percentage, in 
particular compared to middle and lower positions in other service sectors. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that since the crisis, targets have remained a key 
component of HRM strategies of banks. Hence, utilitarianism, with its incentives and 
extrinsic motivation, remains fundamental for banks' view of employees and their 
motivation. 
 
 
35a. Motivation: targets 
 34 
The strongest motivation in my job are targets 
and their evaluation or variable pay 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 12 1,94 1,94 
agree 72 11,67 13,61 
neutral 166 26,90 40,52 
disagree 249 40,36 80,88 
strongly disagree 118 19,12 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
35b. Motivation: team 
The strongest motivation in my job is being 
part of a team 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 122 19,77 19,77 
agree 401 64,99 84,76 
neutral 70 11,35 96,11 
disagree 19 3,08 99,19 
strongly disagree 5 0,81 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
35c. Motivation: cooperation 
The strongest motivation in my job is 
cooperation 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 116 18,80 18,80 
agree 399 64,67 83,47 
neutral 83 13,45 96,92 
disagree 16 2,59 99,51 
strongly disagree 3 0,49 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
35d Motivation: serving client interest 
The strongest motivation in my job is serving 
client interest 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 198 32,09 32,09 
agree 330 53,48 85,58 
neutral 78 12,64 98,22 
disagree 7 1,13 99,35 
strongly disagree 4 0,65 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
35e. Motivation: talents and skills 
The strongest motivation in my job is the 
development of my talents and skills 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 108 17,50 17,50 
agree 348 56,40 73,91 
neutral  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
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disagree 34 5,51 98,70 
strongly disagree 8 1,30 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
Bank employees get their motivation from: 
- targets and variable pay: 14% (59% not) 
- being part of a team: 85% (4% not) 
- cooperation: 83% (2% not) 
- serving client interest: 86% (2% not) 
- development of talents and skills: 74% (7% not) 
 
There is a striking contrast in motivation between this question and the previous 
question. Whereas only 14% is motivated by targets, 74% is controlled by targets. 
The large majority of bank employees (74-86%) is intrinsically motivated by their job 
characteristics: team membership, cooperation, client orientation and development 
of talents and skills. 
 
These results indicate the presence of an ethics of care rather than utilitarianism or 
moral duty in the motivation of bank employees. But banks still rely heavily on the 
carrots and sticks that make part of a utilitarian ethics. 
 
 
36a. Feedback: limited 
I hardly get feedback from my manager  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
often 150 24,31 24,31 
sometimes 342 55,43 79,74 
never 125 20,26 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
36b. Feedback: targets 
I get feedback about my targets  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
often 150 24,31 24,31 
sometimes 360 58,35 82,66 
never 107 17,34 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
36c. Feedback: tasks 
I get feedback on how I have performed a task  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
often 172 27,88 27,88 
sometimes 355 57,54 85,41 
never 90 14,59 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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36d. Feedback: dialogue 
I get meaningful feedback on a dialogue  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
often 189 30,63 30,63 
sometimes 305 49,43 80,06 
never 123 19,94 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
Respondents state the following about the feedback that they receive from their 
manager: 
- little feedback: 24%, sometimes: 55% (together 79%) 
- whether I achieved my targets: 24%, sometimes 58% (together 83%) 
- how I performed a task: 28%, sometimes 58% (together 85%) 
- meaningful dialogue: 31%, sometimes 50% (together 80%) 
 
It is striking that a quarter of the respondents received no feedback from their 
manager. As if the targets are a sufficient measure of performance and 
development. And when feedback is received, it is more often about achieving 
targets (83%) than about the quality of the work done (58%). 
 
 
37. Fear for dismissal 
I am afraid of dismissal  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
yes 205 33,23 33,23 
sometimes 219 35,49 68,72 
no 177 28,69 97,41 
no opinion 16 2,59 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
One third of the respondents is afraid of dismissal and another third experiences 
sometimes this fear. That is two-thirds, which is realistic given the sequence of 
rounds of lay-offs in the sector in the Netherlands since the crisis. The stick of 
dismissal  seems therefore a realistic threat. 
 
 
38. Social plan 
I am satisfied with the social plan of my bank  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
yes 363 58,83 58,83 
nee o143 23,18 82,01 
no opinion 111 17,99 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
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More than half the respondents (59%) are satisfied with the social plan of their bank, 
but a quarter (23%) is not. Perhaps this last percentage is influenced by the trade 
union membership of the respondents. This groups is generally well-informed about 
the social plan. 
 
 
39a. Meaningful: self-respect 
I find my job meaningful because it contributes 
to my self-resect 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 156 25,28 25,28 
agree 336 54,46 79,74 
neutral 68 11,02 90,76 
disagree 40 6,48 97,24 
strongly disagree 17 2,76 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
39b. Meaningful: provides purpose 
I find my job meaningful because it provides a 
purpose 
 
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 155 25,12 25,12 
agree 329 53,32 78,44 
neutral 87 14,10 92,54 
disagree 30 4,86 97,14 
strongly disagree 16 2,59 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
 
 
39c. Meaningful: pleasure 
I find my job meaningful because I enjoy it  
number 
 
per cent 
 
cumulative 
strongly agree 132 21,39 21,39 
agree 271 43,92 65,32 
neutral 126 20,42 85,74 
disagree 58 9,40 95,14 
strongly disagree 30 4,86 100,00 
total 617 100,00  
 
The respondents find their job at the bank meaningful along the following 
dimensions: 
- 80% feels it contributes to their self-respect 
- 78% finds that it provides purpose 
- 65% finds it enjoyable 
 
In short, many of the ordinary bank employees find meaning in a job at the bank. 
The responses to earlier questions suggest that this is probably because of the 
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intrinsic motivation that many of the respondents find in service-orientation, self-
development and teamwork. 
 
 
4.2 Cross tabulations 
 
4.2.1 Background characteristics and banking culture 
 
Are differences in the culture variables linked to differences between the 
respondents? No. There are no statistically significant differences in the results 
between age groups, sex, salary levels or bank at which one is employed. This has 
two implications. First, all large banks in the Netherlands share on average the same 
banking culture. The only exception is the continuation of variable pay at ABN Amro 
bank, whereas the other large banks have abandoned this (apart from the top and 
traders). Second, the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis4, about significant gender 
differences in the behaviour of bankers at the top of banks, is not confirmed at the 
middle and bottom level of banks - at least, not in this survey in the Netherlands. But 
the female respondents in this survey do earn statistically significant less than men, 
on a fulltime basis5. 72% of the women earns less 4.000 euro against 30% of the 
men.  This is probably related to lower function levels by women as compared to 
men and less career opportunities of those jobs. But it may very well be the case 
that discrimination also plays a role. We do not know, because we did not ask 
questions about this in this survey. It clearly requires further investigation. 
 
 
4.2.2 Relations between cultural variables 
 
 
40. Sales of problematic products and client contact (%) 
 Sales of problematic products 
Client 
contact 
 yes no no opinion total 
yes 12 205 32 249 
sometimes 3 50 49 102 
no 1 76 189 266 
total 16 331 270 617 
Pearson chi2(4) = 179.6831; P = 0.000. 
 
       
5% of the respondents who have direct contact with clients admit that they have 
sold products that they are not comfortable with (12 respondents). We have no 
                                                        
4 For a test of the Lehman Sister Hypothesis, see: Irene van Staveren, ‘The Lehman Sisters 
Hypothesis’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38 (5), 2014, p. 995-1014. 
5 Pearson chi2(4) = 111.3283; P = 0.000. 
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information about this percentage before the crisis so we do not know whether this 
share has changed. 
 
 
 
41. Service provision and 'walk the talk' (%) 
 Has the service improved since the crisis? 
Top walks 
the talk 
 better the 
same 
worse no 
opinion 
total 
very much agree 21 8 0 1 30 
agree 75 38 13 14 140 
neutral 53 57 50 22 182 
disagree 39 42 77 16 174 
very much disagree 12 29 48 2 91 
total 200 174 188 55 617 
Pearson chi2(12) = 114.8013; P = 0.000. 
 
 
47% of those who feel that the top does not walk the talk states that the service has 
deteriorated since the crisis. Only 20% of the respondents who feel that the top does 
not walk the talk states that the service has improved. In other words, the more 
consistency in the behaviour at the top of banks, the more likely that employees see 
that service delivery has improved. This finding confirms the findings in the 
international literature about cultural consistency on the one hand and client 
orientation on the other hand. 
 
 
42.  Service provision and products (%) 
 Has the service improved since the crisis? 
Tension 
between 
client 
interest and 
products 
 better the same worse no 
opinion 
total 
often 8 13 48 3 72 
sometimes 96 101 90 17 304 
never 55 38 22 7 122 
no opinion 41 22 28 28 119 
total 200 174 188 55 617 
Pearson chi2(9) = 100.6323; P = 0.000. 
 
           
37% of those who feel a tension between client interest and the products that their 
bank offers, states that service has deteriorated since the crisis. Whereas 18% of 
those who say they never feel a tension state that service has deteriorated: this is 
50% less than in the first group. So, the more bank employees experience a tension 
between client interest and products, the more often they note a deterioration in 
services. 
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This suggests that services improve when the products on offer better serve client 
interests. 
 
 
43. Social role of banks and targets (%) 
 Serve the interests of all stakeholders 
Diverse 
targets with 
long term 
focus  
 very 
much 
agree agree neutral disagree 
very 
much 
disagree total 
very much 
agree 
49 31 6 1 4 91 
agree 75 144 48 10 6 283 
neutral 18 88 58 11 4 179 
disagree 3 22 11 4 1 41 
very much 
disagree 
6 6 7 1 3 23 
total 151 291 130 27 18 617 
Pearson chi2(16) =  99.7568; P = 0.000. 
 
 
80% of those favouring a diversity of targets and long term focus state that the social 
role of banks is to contribute to the interests of al stakeholders. Apparently, a broad 
orientation on stakeholder interests correlates with a longer time horizon, while a 
narrow orientation on shareholders correlates with narrow targets and a short term 
focus.  
 
This finding implies that less focus on sales targets, client satisfaction, compliance 
and other short term goals go hand in hand with attention to all stakeholders. This 
confirms the findings in the literature that long-term goals, such as client relations, 
client interests rather than satisfaction, and trust, contribute to the interests of a 
wide variety of stakeholders of banks. 
 
 
44. Open to criticism and constrained client interest (%) 
 Manager open to criticism 
Client 
interest 
under 
pressure 
 yes sometimes no no 
opinion 
total 
often 56 88 98 5 247 
sometimes 115 96 46 4 261 
never 60 14 4 2 80 
no opinion 9 10 7 3 29 
total 240 208 155 14 617 
Pearson chi2(9) = 101.6296; P = 0.000. 
 
Work pressure and openness of managers to critique appear to be correlated. 40% 
of those experiencing that work pressure constrains client interest state that their 
managers are not open to criticism. So, the more work pressure one feels, the less 
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managers are open to criticism. This may indicate that managers feel unable to 
reduce the work pressure or that they evade discussions with employees about 
reducing work pressure in the interests of clients. 
 
 
45. Own initiative and client interest (%) 
 There is much space for own imitative 
Client 
interest 
under 
pressure 
 very 
much 
agree agree neutral disagree 
very 
much 
disagree total 
often 7 54 82 80 24 247 
sometimes 24 112 69 51 5 261 
never 16 50 8 5 1 80 
no opinion 0 15 6 6 2 29 
total 47 231 165 142 32 617 
Pearson chi2(12) = 110.6703; P = 0.000. 
 
 
The fact that client interest is constrained by work pressure is also related to a lack 
of space for taking initiative. 42% of those who experience that work pressure 
constrains client interest experience limited opportunities for taking initiative. The 
more client interest is under pressure, the less space bank employees feel to take 
initiative. 
 
This finding suggests that bank employees are on the automatic pilot when work 
pressure is so high that it constrains the interests of clients. 
 
 
46. Deadlines and client interest (%) 
 Space for own initiative is constrained by deadlines 
Client 
interest 
under 
pressure 
 very 
much 
agree agree neutral disagree 
very 
much 
disagree total 
often 63 123 42 17 2 247 
sometimes 15 107 92 45 2 261 
never 3 13 32 27 5 80 
no opinion 2 12 10 4 1 29 
total 83 255 176 93 10 617 
Pearson chi2(12) = 124.5796; P = 0.000. 
 
 
What is the main reason for the work pressure that affects client interest? 75% of 
those who suffer from this state that their room for manoeuvre is constrained by 
deadlines. 
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So, it seems that the endless sequence of deadlines urges the employees to switch 
on the automatic pilot, running from client to client and from ticking boxes on one 
form to another. 
 
 
47.  Autonomy and client interest (%) 
 Autonomy to do one's job optimally 
Client 
interest 
under 
pressure 
 very 
much much neutral little 
very 
little total 
often 8 63 81 74 21 247 
sometimes 13 108 93 43 4 261 
never 17 41 15 7 0 80 
no opinion 4 7 12 4 2 29 
total 42 219 201 128 27 617 
Pearson chi2(12) =  91.7472; P = 0.000. 
 
 
Close to the "own initiative" of the previous question is autonomy. Autonomy is a 
crucial element of intrinsic motivation, according to the literature that we discussed. 
38% of those who experience that client interest is under pressure experiences little 
autonomy. But 73% of those who never feel that client interest is under pressure 
claims to have much autonomy6. This is a revealing finding. It indicates that having 
autonomy runs parallel with having the scope to serve client interests. 
 
As a consequence, this finding suggests that constraining the autonomy of bank 
employees is not in the interest of clients. Probably because it does not leave scope 
for own initiative, reflection and consultation with colleagues on how to best serve a 
client's interests in a particular situation. This finding does not match the extrinsic 
motivation resulting from a utilitarian ethics. It is the ethics of care, instead, which 
helps to explain the relationship. Because autonomy creates the space for taking 
responsibility for one's decisions, which helps to serve client interests. 
 
 
48. Autonomy en sales of problematic products (%) 
 Autonomy to do one's job optimally 
Sold 
problematic 
products 
 very 
much much neutral little 
very 
little total 
yes 0 2 1 5 8 16 
no 21 110 112 74 14 331 
no 
opinion 
21 107 88 49 5 270 
total 42 219 201 128 27 617 
Pearson chi2(8) =  91.4918; P = 0.000. 
 
 
                                                        
6 This statistical relationship is not significant at 95% but at 90%. 
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40% of those who never sold a problematic product in the past two years 
experiences autonomy, whereas 13% of those who did admit they sold a 
problematic product experience autonomy, and 81% did not feel autonomy7. In 
other words, less autonomy and sales of problematic products go hand in hand. 
 
The statistical relationship points out that more autonomy correlates with more 
integrity towards clients. This finding confirms the result of table 47 above, which 
found that more autonomy is in the interest of clients. 
 
 
49. Motivation for client interest and relation with clients (%) 
 Motivated by serving client interests 
Evaluation of 
relation with 
clients 
 very 
much much neutral little 
very 
little total 
very 
important 
143 124 9 0 0 276 
important 19 71 6 1 0 97 
not 
important 
0 1 1 0 0 2 
not 
applicable 
36 134 62 6 4 242 
total 198 330 78 7 4 617 
Pearson chi2(12) = 142.2349; P = 0.000. 
 
 
96% of those who state that they value the relation with clients are motivated by 
serving client interests. Hence, bank employees are consistent in their objectives and 
motives. The stronger the motivation to serve clients, the higher the evaluation of 
client interests. 
 
 
50. Motivation by sales targets and client interests (%) 
 Motivated by meeting targets 
Sales targets 
are in the 
interest of 
clients 
 very 
much much neutral little 
very 
little total 
very much 
agree 
0 0 3 2 1 6 
agree 1 18 21 15 9 64 
neutral 5 22 58 63 9 157 
disagree 3 23 72 135 43 276 
very much 
disagree 
3 9 12 34 56 114 
total 12 72 166 249 118 617 
Pearson chi2(16) = 126.1854; P = 0.000. 
 
                                                        
7 This statistical relationship is not significant at 95% but at 90%. 
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Only 10% of those who think sales targets are not in the interest of clients are 
motivated by targets. To the contrary, 69% of those who think sales targets are not 
in the interest of clients are not motivated by targets. This implies that those who 
are against sales targets are not motivated by targets themselves. Hence, other 
forms of motivation seem more appropriate for this relatively large group of bank 
employees. Moreover, this finding supports a cultural shift from the extrinsic 
motivation of utilitarianism to the intrinsic motivation inherent in an ethics of care.  
 
 
The analysis of the cross tabulations paints a clear picture. Service delivery by banks 
has not really improved since the crisis and this is related to a mismatch between 
walk and talk of leaders and products that are not in the interest of clients. The less 
support for sales targets, the more recognition of the interests of all stakeholders, 
and the less one is motivated by targets in general, the more critical one is about 
sales targets. 
 
The less autonomy, the more likely it is that employees sell problematic products. 
And the less autonomy and space for own initiative, the more bank employees feel 
that client interest comes under pressure. When, in addition, managers are not open 
to criticism, this only reinforces the pressure on client interests. 
 
The banking culture in the Netherlands appears to be most constraining around the 
scope that employees experience for taking their responsibility towards clients and 
to question their managers. There is clearly no caring culture in which taking 
responsibility is stimulated and disagreement is regarded as a natural part of the 
interaction between employees and their managers. The consequences of this 
culture show in the continued offering of problematic products and the constraints 
employee experience in serving client interests. Not despite targets but rather 
because of the widespread system of performance targets in banks in the 
Netherlands. Targets receive little support from bank employees and almost nobody 
feels motivated by them. It is time to reconsider them and thereby the closed and 
top-down banking culture. 
 
 
4.3 Open questions 
 
The survey included the opportunity to answer open questions. Below is a summary 
of the answers to these questions, covering about 50% of all answers and showing a 
wide diversity of answers. The names of banks that were mentioned have been 
deleted from this report. 
 
The answers support the general picture emerging from the survey that bank 
employees often lack the time and scope to focus on client interest. The 
respondents complain about the superficial way that banks deal with client interest. 
And they illustrate the dominance of sales targets in day-to-day operations of banks. 
Several respondents even use the term 'fear-culture'. Although only a small 
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proportion of the survey respondents have answered the open questions, those who 
did answer them indicate that the carrot of targets and variable pay has now turned 
into a stick, with the threat of dismissal. 
 
 "I have been at the bank for 15 years now and I experience that sales targets 
are more important than ever. In my case, I now receive lower assessments than 
before. My effort, engagement, teamwork and other contributions do not seem to 
matter anymore ... We have the right tools and receive training for client interaction, 
but managers is simply focus on sales results of the local bank. When these are 
disappointing, headquarters may decide to close down our location." 
 
 "I would like to see an exchange of traineeships with other banks. This would 
contribute to an open culture with more innovation and creativity. Moreover, such 
openness would help to develop a self-correcting culture." 
 
 "Only those who uncritically fit the system make a career. One should not 
fall ill. Managers fear their own managers. Bullying of workers who are critical 
is common." 
 
 "My bank claims great ambitions around client innovation. But the 
organization and its culture is absolutely not fit to fulfil this ambition. There is 
a lack of cooperation. Instead, managers build their own small kingdoms, 
headed by non-innovators, who lack courage and leadership. They hide behind 
terminology such as 'ownership'. This creates an almost sectarian atmosphere 
in which employees are locked up in their golden cage of mortgage rate 
discounts and other employee benefits. Many of them do not want to leave the 
bank because of these benefits." 
 
 "Client interest is key, but at the same time support tasks are eliminated 
because they would be too time-consuming. But nobody takes the opportunity 
costs in the long run into account. Very short-sighted. Many of my colleagues 
would like to leave the bank ... Very few enjoy their job." 
 
"I experience high work pressure and a 'fear-culture'. There is no way to address 
abuse and problems are not taken seriously. Colleagues are simply afraid to 
lose their job!" 
 
"Especially over the past two to three years, I feel huge work pressure, limited 
communication from managers, a bad atmosphere, and clarity about how I am 
being assessed. Our department must reduce personnel by 20% but the work 
pressure actually requires hiring more people, not less. It is likely that this 
situation contributes to the bad atmosphere. Every day, I try to do everything I 
can to improve the image of the bank. But this is not valued in the assessment 
system, and hence, I receive only a moderate assessment result." 
 
"Changing an old savings account to a new one often makes very little 
difference for a client, but the employee who arranges it scores sales points." 
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"Perverse incentives are inappropriate. Some managers think that the more 
you sell the better your service to clients." 
 
"Targets go against the legal obligation that we have to care for clients. The 
performance assessment is for one hundred per cent tuned to targets and we 
are assessed on these targets on a weekly basis. This is done with rankings of 
the top-three sales performers in the region and at national level. There are 
even individual targets, which is against the policy." 
 
"I have once sold a credit card to a client but did not feel this was right. I did it 
because I felt under pressure to meet my sales target. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The survey results show that the large majority of bank employees wants to serve 
client interest. But the intrinsic motivation of the average bank employee is 
undermined by a large difference between 'walk' and 'talk' of leaders, a strong 
concern with performance targets, limited autonomy, low trust, and the restriction 
of self-development and initiative by unresponsive managers and some problematic 
products. 
 
Banks rely on utilitarian ethics in the motivation and reward of employees and they 
try to use moral duty ethics in the case of ethical dilemmas. But the average banker 
finds that the social role of banks requires an ethics of care. Bank employees like to 
work from such an ethical approach but find it difficult to do so due to the pressure 
to follow utilitarian ethics, distrust, and cutbacks as well as increased regulation. As a 
consequence, they do, on average, not see an improvement in service delivery since 
the crisis, while they fear that client interest suffers. 
 
In conclusion, the average Dutch bank employee is intrinsically motivated and very 
well aware that banking requires that client interest is key and that trust, 
cooperation, and critique all make part of such a focus. But the dominant banking 
culture in the Netherlands still relies on a utilitarian ethics with its system of extrinsic 
motivation. The challenge for cultural change in Dutch banking is how to solve this 
miss-match. 
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